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Abstract 
Despite an increasing desire to host major sport events there is almost no research that tries to 
identify and measure the possible negative spillovers they generate. In particular, there is 
limited understanding about crime responses. This paper investigates the causal relation 
between hosting the 1990 Football World Cup and crime rates at the province level. Using a 
fixed effect estimator to control for province level differences in crime, we find that hosting 
the Football World Cup leads to a significant increase in most property crimes (bag-
snatching, pick-pocketing, shop-lifting and burglary), but only in one violent crime 
(intentional personal injuries). 
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1. Introduction 
The decision to host a mega event like the Football World Cup generates both opportunities 
and concerns. During these events it is likely that employment and business opportunities 
increase, new or improved infrastructures are developed, revenue for local governments 
increase, and tourism flourishes; thus giving international recognition to the city. This might 
even boost the feeling of being part of a community. The down side might include traffic 
congestion, increased crime rates, pollution, increased price of land, housing, goods and 
services, more car accidents, and animosity between tourists and locals (Baloglu and Deccio, 
2002; Clarke, 2004; Andersson, Rustad and Solberg, 2004; Dwyer and Mules, 2005; Hiller, 
1989; Burns and Mules, 1989). In this paper we focus our attention on one relevant concern 
of hosting a mega event: its effect on crime, which leads to social costs, typically borne by 
the citizen of the hosting city (Burbank, Heying and Andranovich, 2000; Preuss and Solberg, 
2006).  
The problem of crime during a mega event is often neglected, not investigated, and not 
correctly perceived by the local residents. Ohmann, Jones and Wilkes (2006) analyzed the 
perceived impact of the 2006 Football World Cup upon residents of one of the host 
provinces. Crime was one of the explored perceived negative impacts. They found that, even 
though crime rates did increase, just 12% of citizen correctly perceived this increase. A 
possible explanation for the discrepancy between the respondents’ perception and police 
report could be lack of media coverage on these arrests.  
The 1990 Football World Cup has been chosen because it is second only to the Olympics as 
the biggest tournament in the world, and  is the last major sport event in Italy for which the 
data are available. Using official crime statistics of around 100 Italian provinces over several 
years we use the World Cup as our testing ground of criminal spillovers. 
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In particular we identify provinces that hosted a game between June 8 and July 8, 1990 (the 
treatment group), and compare them to those provinces that did not have such mega event in 
place (our control group). Map 1 and Table 1 show, respectively, the provinces that hosted 
the football matches, the name of the stadiums, their capacity and the number of matches 
played. 
 
<Map 1> 
<Table 1> 
 
We find that in 1990 there was an increase in crime rates greater in the host provinces than in 
the others for most property crimes, and that these effects are robust to controlling for other 
factors often thought to be associated with crime.  
 
2. Literature review 
Sport events are likely to be the scene of both premeditated and opportunistic crimes, like 
theft, drunkenness, disorderly behaviour and vandalism (Hall, 1992; Getz, 1997). Only few 
papers have looked at the relationship between hosting mega events and crime, Hall (1997) 
identifies a relationship between the hosting of these events and an increase in robbery, 
sexual and common assaults. Hall and Selwood (1989) mention the increase in petty crime 
during the America’s Cup in 1987. Barker et al. (2002) analyze the America’s Cup 2000 in 
Auckland, and notice that crime is a spatial phenomenon that is subject to dislocation, and the 
reason why it is likely to be higher in areas hosting special events is related to its tendency to 
cluster in areas where there is an higher concentration of tourism amenities and attractions 
and where security is less concentrated. These results are also in line with Billings and 
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Depken (2011), who find that criminal activity increases in the vicinity of the venue when 
sport events are held. 
Most of the studies focus on the relationship between crime and tourism finding a positive 
relationship between them, mainly for property crimes. In particular, Howsen  and Jarrell 
(1990),  McPheters and Stronge, (1974) and Harper (2001) find that tourism has a positive 
impact on the crimes of burglary, larceny and robbery and no impact on crimes against the 
person (murder, rape and assault). 
Researchers have focused on the relationship between crime and tourism because the 
perceived riskiness of a city could induce tourists to choose alternative and less dangerous 
destinations. And it is hard to change the negative image of a city that potential tourists may 
hold (Dimanche and Lepetic, 1999). But this same reason represents the major shortcoming 
of analyses based on simple correlations between crime and tourism: if tourists avoid to visit 
cities with high levels of crime the estimated effect of tourism on crime is going to be biased. 
This study estimates how exogenously driven variation in the attractiveness of cities, in our 
case hosting of a World Cup game, influences crime.  
 
3. The economic model  
The basic assumption of the economic model of crime is that individuals maximize their 
expected utility and, consequently, their decision to engage or not in criminal activities is 
rational, and responds to the perceptions of the benefits and costs of illegal actions (see 
Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973; Block and Heineke, 1975; Freeman, 1999, Howsen, Jarrell, 
1987). Crime is regarded exactly as any other economically important activity or “industry” 
(Becker, 1968). Criminals, victims or representatives of law enforcement, all respond to 
incentives, both positive e negative, and try to maximize their wellbeing (Ehrlich, 1996; 
Marselli and Vannini, 1999). The approach follows the economists’ usual analysis of choice 
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and assumes that a person commits an offense if the expected utility he derives exceeds the 
utility he could get by using his time and other resources differently (Becker, 1968).  
It has to be pointed out that people have different disgust for crime, but they respond to 
incentives, and if they rewards structure associated with an action changes, their choices are 
also likely to change. 
The supply of crime depends on several factors, like the legitimate labour opportunities of 
potential criminals, the probability of arrest and penalization, and the potential criminal 
earnings (Freeman, 1996 and 1999). 
For a given individual the expected benefits (B) of committing a crime are equal to the 
expected payoff, that is  the probability of not being apprehended (1-p) times the rewards (R), 
minus the total costs associated with planning and executing the crime (C), minus the 
foregone wages from legitimate activities (W), minus the expected punishment (S) for the 
committed crime (pS).  We assume that individuals are risk neutral. A crime is going to be 
committed (Cr=1) every time the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs: 
 
(1)                                  ]0)1[(]0[ ≥−−−−=≥= pSWCRpIBICr , 
 
where I[.] is an indicator function equal to one whenever the statement is true and 0 
otherwise. Summing these individual decisions over individuals and time, and dividing 
everything by the populations leads to a crime rate that is a function of p, R, C, W, and S. 
Starting from these theoretical considerations we will specify and estimate a model in which 
the dependent variable is the number of crimes and the explanatory variables are a number of 
economic and social characteristics which are supposed to capture all the factors that 
determine the supply of crime (a detailed description is given in the following paragraph). 
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4. Data and explanatory variables 
The empirical implementation of the theoretical model described above uses the number of 
the reported crimes at the province level as the dependent variable. We take into 
consideration those crimes that could reasonably increase during a mega event, an event that 
usually creates a mood of general euphoria and creates more occasions of aggregation. These 
events tend to make cities more chaotic and typically attract several people from abroad. The 
crimes chosen for our investigation are mainly those against property: pick-pocketing, bag-
snatching, shop-lifting, burglary in flats, theft ex car, theft on the railways, car theft, and 
fraud. We also take into account some crimes against the person: sexual crimes and 
intentional personal injuries, because football matches often bring with them a lot of violence 
both in and outside the stadiums. Finally we consider prostitution and drug. 
The source of data is the “Statistica della delittuosità” published by ISTAT, the Italian 
Statistical Bureau. The data represent crimes reported to law enforcement and later 
transmitted to the Prefetture, which are the provincial police offices, and ultimately 
transmitted to the prosecutors. They started to be collected during the 1930s and have been 
collected since then with the exception of some years during the World War II. Most of them 
are just in printed and not in an electronic format (including those used in this paper). 
The estimation relies on a panel of 4 years (1988-1991). Data on crime are often measured 
with error, largely because reporting crimes is costly to the victim, which leads to 
underreporting (Howsen and Jarrell, 1987). Victims very often consider it just a waste of time 
because, for example, the probability to recover a wallet or a bicycle stolen is very low. 
Underreporting is most pronounced for low-value property crime (e.g. common theft) and for 
crimes carrying a social stigma for the victim (e.g. rape). It means that estimates on crime 
might be downward biased, and even more seriously if the level of reporting changes during 
mega events (e.g. tourists report less than residents). But measurement errors can also go in 
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the opposite direction if, for example, victims receive compensation (Ehrlich, 1996). This is 
confirmed by the high number of the complaints filed for car thefts, complaints that are 
necessary to receive insurance money (Freeman, 1999).  
Since the sport mega event lasted just one month it would have been better to use monthly 
data to identify the relationship. These data are not available. Using yearly data, as we do, 
might  downward bias our results. 
In our research crimes are defined as the number of offences reported to law enforcement 
authorities. They do not correspond to the number of offenders, since an offender could have 
committed more than one reported crime.  
As a measure of law enforcement we use the clearance rate, defined as the ratio of known 
offenders to all recorded crimes for each category. We don’t use an aggregated measure of 
deterrence because the probability of detection varies considerably across crime types 
(Cherry and List, 2002).   
The probability of detection proxies for the probability of apprehension and allows us to 
capture the effect of deterrence and law enforcement (Buonanno and Leonida, 2006). 
Deterrence essentially modifies the price of crime for all offenders.  
To measure the expected gains from committing a crime (the rewards R of the theoretical 
model) we use added value per capita, an indicator of the general level of prosperity in the 
provinces. Sesnowitz and Hexter (1982) use medium household income as a proxy for the 
expected illegal gains, because they reflect the “presence of individuals who provide good 
targets for thieves and thus may lead to a high gain component of the crime.”  
The opportunity cost of being imprisoned represents the major cost of crime, in part because 
of the foregone employment opportunities. The lower the unemployment rate the higher the 
cost of a given prison sentence to an individual; therefore, we expect the coefficient on the 
unemployment rate to be positive (Howsen and Jarrell, 1987). Average wage allows one to 
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control for legal earnings; higher wages increase the opportunity cost of criminal behaviour. 
The unemployment rate and the average wage proxy for W in our theoretical model. 
Both average wage and added value are expressed in real 1988 prices terms using the 
Consumer Price Index (ISTAT and Work Histories Italian Panel1). 
Among the socioeconomic variables we include, at the province level an index of inequality 
and the dependency index.  Inequality might influence crime (above the role of poverty 
alone) because the presence of the rich may increase the returns to crime R (Glaeser, 1999) 
and, at the same time, a strong presence of poor people, represents a potentially larger supply 
of criminals for offences against property (lower W). This variable has been shown to be 
important in explaining crime rates across countries (Fajnzylber, P., Lederman, D. and 
Lloayza, N. , 2002). To proxy for inequality in income we use the ratio between the number 
of people employed in the service sector and the total employed using WHIP data. The 
percentage of employed in the sector of services measures both the impact on crime of the 
presence of the white collar worker, and of the greater inequality in the income distribution 
that is often correlated to a greater development of the service sector (Marselli and Vannini, 
1997). Finally, the dependency index is a demographic indicator equal to the ratio between 
the population older than 65 and the population between age 20 and age 64. It is well 
documented that most crimes are perpetrated by youths (Imrohoroglu, Merlo, Rupert). 
Freeman (1999) shows that the relative arrest rate rises for teenagers, peaks for persons aged 
16-18, then declines modestly with age. This might have to do with the cost of crime C 
increasing with age. To capture any potential differential effects with respect to the location 
and time of the crime, in particular, hosting a World Cup game, we define some geographic 
and time dummies (Drakos and Kutan, 2003):  
− Host province in 1990 = 1 if the crime took place in 1990 and in a province that 
hosted the Football World Cup and 0 otherwise. This is our variable of interest. 
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− Near host provinces in 1990 = 1 if the crime took place in 1990 in a province whose 
distance from the province that hosted the Football World Cup is less than 100 km 
and 0 otherwise. This variable is supposed to capture possible spatial spillovers. 
− Year 1990 = 1 if the crime took place in the year 1990 and 0 otherwise. This variable 
is extremely important as it is supposed to capture year 1990 specific effects not 
captured by our regressors.  
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics used in the regression analysis. 
 
<Table 2> 
  
The number of crimes and the economic variables have been normalized by the size of the 
population P 2 in order to obtain per capita values. 
Added value has been divided by 1,000 to make the corresponding coefficient more easily 
readable. 
In the Appendix there is a qualitative description of the offences we select for our analysis. 
 
5. Estimation model and methodology 
Our research strategy is to investigate whether there was any change in crime rates in 1990 in 
provinces that hosted the Football World Cup compared to what happened in other years, and 
compared to what happened in provinces that did not host a game. It means that we are 
interested in estimating the coefficient of the dummy “Host province in 1990” (H90), 
controlling for deterrence, legal and illegal gains, socio-economic variables, a 1990 dummy 
that captures how crime rates changed in non-hosting provinces, and province fixed effects 
that controls for any preexisting differences in crime rates across provinces. 
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 Using data on all the provinces of Italy, we use the following empirical specification: 
 
(2)                                               cijt = β0 + x’ijt β+ αi + μijt 
 
where cijt is the number of crimes per capita in the province i  for crime typology j in year t, 
x’ijt is a vector of exogenous variables, αi are province fixed effect and  μijt are  “idiosyncratic 
errors.” To summarize, equation (2) includes observed and unobserved components. 
With the introduction of the relevant variables equation (2) becomes:    
(3)          cijt = β0 + β1Aijt + β2Wijt+ β3 ΔH90ijt+ β4Iijt + β5Uijt + β6 Sijt + β7Dijt + β10ΔN90ijt + 
β11Y90ijt +  νijt 
                                                                                i = 1,.....Ν; t = 1,....Τ 
 
where the subscript i represents each of the 95 provinces in Italy during the period 1988-
1991, c measures crime, A is the added value, W is the average wage, ΔH90 is the dummy for 
the host provinces, I is the demographic dependency ratio, U is the unemployment rate, S is 
the number of people employed in the sector services over the total, D is the deterrence ratio, 
ΔN90 is the dummy “near the host province”, Y90 is the dummy “year 1990” and νijt= αi + μijt is 
the composite error. 
We want to test the null hypothesis that hosting a game has no effect on crime 0: 3 =β . The 
alternative is H1 .0: 3 ≠β  
 
(4)         3β   = [ ]) x'0, =  1990in host  |E(crime - ) 1, = 1990in host  |E(crime x'  -[ ]) x'0, =  1990in host -non |E(crime - ) 1, = 1990in host -non |E(crime x'  
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This is the difference in crime rates in host provinces versus non host provinces in the year of 
the World Cup versus all the other years. 
The αi are province fixed effects which reflect all factors affecting crime that do not change 
over time. In other words they capture the unobservable province specific characteristics (the 
so called “province heterogeneity”). These might include specific geographical features, fixed 
differences in social capital, fixed differences in police enforcement, and different attitudes 
towards crime, and in reporting crimes (these differences are typically slow to change). 
Notice that these effects are also going to capture potential differences in sanctions S across 
provinces (see Eq. 1). Many other factors may not be exactly constant, but they might be 
roughly constant over a four-year period (Wooldridge, 2002; Howsen  and Jarrell, 1987).  
Furthermore the presence of criminal organizations with deep and, sometimes, secular 
territorial roots is a peculiarity of Italy and it is very difficult to distinguish the crimes 
committed by single offenders from those committed by these organizations. Statistics are 
quite unreliable in measuring this phenomenon, so this component is mostly not observed. 
But given that these organizations are quite stable (they are also difficult to eradicate) fixed 
effects are necessary to control for their presence (Marselli and Vannini, 1999). 
Moreover, even if these unobserved components were changing over time, as long as the 
treatment (hosting a football game) does not depend on these time-varying unobservable 
components the treatment effect would still be unbiased. 
Nevertheless, we also show the results obtained using the random effect estimator, as 
opposed to our preferred fixed effect estimator.3 The choice between random and fixed 
effects depends on whether αi and xitj are correlated. Given that province effects are important 
in our context and that we want to exclude bias in our estimation of the explanatory variables 
due to correlation with the province effects, the random-effects estimator might not be the 
best choice (Neumayer, 2004). Hausman (1978) proposed a test based on the difference 
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between the random effects and fixed effects estimates. Since FE is consistent when αi and xitj 
are correlated, but RE is inconsistent, a statistically significant difference between the two 
estimators is interpreted as evidence against the random effects assumption.  
Tables 3-4 report the results for each type of crime analyzed using fixed and random effects 
along with the Hausman tests.  
 
<Tables 3-4> 
 
In half of the regressions the Hausman test suggests the use of the fixed effects estimator. 
This means that the unobserved provincial component is correlated with some regressors. But 
overall the coefficients on hosting a game in 1990 are always quite close to each other in the 
two alternative specifications. The main  exceptions are fraud and shop-lifting. For frauds the 
same result has been found by Marselli and Vannini (1997), who stress how this offence is 
less related than the others to organized crime. The same reasoning applies to shoplifting, a 
common type of juvenile offending (Oberwittler, 2004), probably related to a temporary rush 
of excitement, and to the enjoyable feeling of defiance and potency in just “getting away with 
it”, rather than to province-specific fixed effects (Bessant, 1993). 
Given that the fixed effect estimators are consistent even when random effect ones are not, 
we are mainly going to discuss the results that are based on fixed effects specifications 
(Tables 3 and 4). 
 
6. Discussion of the estimated results 
Hosting the 1990 Football World Cup led, as expected, to a significant increase in most of 
crimes against property. In particular we find a significant and positive effect (whose increase 
at the average level of crime is indicated in parenthesis) for: pick-pocketing (+ 80%), bag-
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snatching (+ 51%), shop-lifting (+ 29%) and burglary (+ 29%). See Tables 3-4. The crimes 
against property that are not affected are: theft ex car, theft on the railways, car theft and 
fraud.  
The increased number of police forces might have prevented crimes committed in the streets 
for which a particular ability and more time is required (theft ex car and car theft). With 
respect to theft on railways, it is likely that railways were seen as strategic points, and thus 
were defended by a higher number of police forces. 
Looking at the other offences, intentional personal injuries appears to be significantly and 
positively related to the fact that a province hosted the World Cup with a variation of 34%, 
while fraud, drug, prostitution and rapes do not show any significant correlation.  
The results for the intentional personal injuries are in line with the results by Rees and 
Schnepel (2009), who find that football college games are associated with a higher aggressive 
behaviour (+ 18% for vandalism), even worsened in the case of the 1990 World Cup by the 
presence of the Hooligans, a large group of English supporters that typically create disorder 
and violence around the time of a football match. 
The definition of fraud is extremely wide, including also illegal activities that are not done 
“in the street,” and it relates to “the deceiving of someone to damage him usually to obtain 
property or services unjustly (example are, false advertising, identity theft, false billing, 
forgery of documents or signatures, false insurance claim, investment frauds, etc. ,” so it is 
not surprising that it does not change significantly due to the World Cup. 
The crimes of drug and prostitution are extremely difficult to measure in official statistics, 
because they are essentially voluntary transactions (Levitt, 2004). Furthermore in the ISTAT 
statistics prostitution is defined as “exploitation and abetting of prostitution,” that is only a 
limited definition of prostitution. The dummy used to investigate changes in crimes in the 
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provinces near the hosting ones is not significantly different from zero, which means that 
there was no significant spillover effect on neighbouring provinces. 
Finally, the dummy year 1990 isolate the variations in crimes committed in 1990. We find 
significant and positive results for shop-lifting and burglary. 
Let us now briefly discuss the coefficients of the remaining variables. Even if we cannot 
identify a relation of causality between the dependent variable and the remaining independent 
regressors, we can observe and describe the existence of significant correlations. Among the 
socioeconomic variables added value is significantly correlated with almost all the crimes 
against property with a positive sign. It is in line with the theoretical model that considers 
added value as a proxy of the opportunity of illegal gains. 
The demographic dependency index is significantly related to most crimes against property 
(bag-snatching, theft ex car, theft on the railways and car theft) with the expected negative 
sign. Both unemployment and average wage represent the cost opportunities of being 
involved in the criminal market and we should expect a negative relationship with the 
different kind of crimes, but only the coefficient on unemployment is significant, and only in 
the random effects model,  probably because the variable does not change much over time. 
This result is coherent with the empirical literature on this topic that did not find, if not in 
very simplified models, an unambiguous and significant relationship between the two 
phenomena (Marselli and Vannini, 2000).  
Average wage is significant and positive only for car theft and (at 10 percent level) for shop-
lifting. It can be explained if the average wage is not only a measure of the opportunity cost 
to enter the criminal market, but it is also a measure of individual income, whose growth 
could be correlated with a larger consumption of drugs and alcoholics (Cook and Zarkin, 
1985) and, as already discussed, with a higher propensity to commit crimes. 
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The deterrence variables are significant with the expected negative sign just for intentional 
personal injuries and for burglary. 
 
7. Robustness checks 
We perform various robustness checks. In the first robustness check we added province-
specific linear time trends. We want to make sure that simple pre-existing trends are not 
explaining our results. Given that we have only 4 years of data the identification of the 
treatment effect hinges on discontinous changes in 1990 compared to 1988, 89, and 91. 
Where treatment effects were significant without province-specific trends the treatment 
effects are still significant (in addition the treatment effect for thefts ex car becomes 
significant), though they tend to be lower. Given the few number of years of trend is based on 
this is not very surprising. (Tables 5 and 5a). 
We also performed two additional analyses that have to do with the presence of tourists. 
Tourists, whether foreign or not, might be more or less likely to be victimized during sports 
events than locals. Therefore  we collected data on the presence of tourists from the 
Statistiche del turismo, ISTAT, and estimated the model adding tourists (both domestic and 
foreigner) and an interaction between the host province 1990 dummy variable and the 
number of tourists.  
Tourist flows, both foreign and domestic measure the daily presence of tourists, that is the 
number of arrivals times the days of stay. Unfortunately, we have to use yearly figures of 
tourist flows since monthly ones are not available. A large number of tourists in an area 
increases the number of unidentified people in an area, potential suspects, making it easier to 
escape apprehension, but more tourists are also potential victims (Howsen and Jarrell, 1990). 
Finally, the social consequences for victimizing tourists are very low, because their 
extraneousness to the local community prevents the criminal to incur the other residents’, 
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who may be relatives of friends of the victim, hostilities (Chesney-Lind and Lind, 1986). 
Foreign and domestic tourists are per capita and have been divided by 1,000 to make their 
coefficient more easily readable. The estimated treatment effects do not vary much when we 
control for yearly presence of turists and are shown in Table 5 and 5a. The same is true when 
we interact tourists with the hosting province in 1990. In this case the interaction shows that 
the higher the number of tourists in the hosting city in 1990, the lower the crimes of bag-
snatching, shop lifting and theft in the railways.  
 
<Tables 5> 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
We identify the causal effect of hosting one of the most important sport events, a Football 
World Cup, on several crime categories. 
We find evidence of a sizeable positive relationship between hosting a game and most crimes 
against property. The identification is based on the assumption that, conditional on several 
time-varying characteristics of the provinces, in the absence of the World Cup provinces that 
hosted soccer games would have had trends in crime like provinces that did not host a game. 
Future research will try to evaluate the social cost of these additional crimes, in order to assist 
city officials that need to decide whether to host a mega event. 
On the external validity of this analysis, the treatment effect might certainly be very different 
depending on the country involved. The United States, for example, hosted the World Cup in 
1994 but football is way less popular there than it is in Europe or in South America. One 
would thus imagine that the effects on crime might be very different as well. Replicating this 
analysis using other countries (the US in 1994, France in 1998, South Korea and Japan in 
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2002, Germany in 2006, South Africa 2010) would thus be a natural follow-up study, but 
goes beyond the scope of this work. 
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Map 1- Host cities of the 1990 Football World Cup 
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Table 1- The Stadiums, their capacity and the matches played 
City Stadium Capacity Matches 
Bari Stadio “San Nicola” 58,000 5 
Bologna Stadio “R. Dall’Ara” 39,500 4 
Cagliari Stadio “Sant’Elia” 40,000 3 
Firenze Stadio “A. Franchi” 47,500 4 
Genova Stadio “L. Ferraris” - Marassi 40,000 4 
Milano Stadio “G. Meazza”- San Siro 85,500 6 
Napoli Stadio “San Paolo” 73,000 5 
Palermo Stadio “R. Barbera” - La Favorita 37,500 3 
Roma Stadio “Olimpico” 83,000 6 
Torino Stadio “delle Alpi” 69,000 5 
Udine Stadio “Friuli” 42,000 3 
Verona Stadio “M. Bentegodi” 42,500 4 
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Table 2. Descriptive information on variables   
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Rapes 343 0.014 0.009 0.000 0.071 
Intentional personal injuries 380 0.149 0.140 0.001 0.911 
Pickpocketing 380 0.890 1.671 0.000 10.65 
Bag-snatching 379 0.428 0.618 0.000 3.321 
Shop-lifting 380 0.488 0.346 0.015 2.040 
Burglary 380 1.360 0.899 0.073 6.400 
Theft ex car 380 3.169 3.284 0.258 18.48 
Theft on the railways 376 0.130 0.259 0.000 1.773 
Car theft 380 1.594 2.037 0.100 10.881 
Fraud 380 0.251 0.242 0.010 2.474 
Drugs 380 .270  .242 .003  1.578  
Prostitution 372 .011  .0303  0  .427  
Added value  380 18946.20 4682.85 9817.19 28696.31 
Average wage 380 9719.11 1072.72 5782.42 12935.50 
Host province in 1990 380 0.032 0.175 0.000 1.000 
Dependency Index 380 47.878 4.073 37.620 56.760 
Unemployment Rate 380 11.437 7.263 1.951 33.962 
Employed in Services/Total employed 380 34.16 9.32 18.00 68.80 
Pr. of detection for intentional personal injuries 327 0.826 0.201 0.000 1.000 
Pr. of detection for Pickpocketing 380 0.864 0.127 0.296 1.125 
Pr. of detection for bag snatching 380 0.045 0.061 0.000 0.500 
Pr. of detection for shop-lifting 378 0.123 0.122 0.000 1.000 
Pr. of detection for burglary 380 0.178 0.082 0.043 0.449 
Pr. of detection for theft ex car 380 0.084 0.042 0.018 0.357 
Pr. of detection for theft on the railways 364 0.090 0.145 0.000 1.000 
Pr. of detection for car theft 380 0.091 0.063 0.000 0.400 
Pr. of detection for fraud 380 0.747 0.133 0.237 0.991 
Pr. of detection for Drugs 380 0.961 0.053 0.583 1.050 
Pr. of detection for prostitution 330 0.926 0.168 0.000 1.154 
Foreign tourists 380 1770.45 3978.73 9.48 39714.73 
Domestic tourists 380 5171.09 7993.31 311.56 55249.75 
Near host provinces 380 0.200 0.401 0.000 1.000 
Near host provinces in 1990 380 0.050 0.218 0.000 1.000 
Year 1990 380 0.250 0.434 0.000 1.000 
 1ISTAT (Italian Statistical Bureau) “Statistica della delittuosità” (1988-1991); 2Quindici anni di statistiche 
provinciali (edited by Confindustria-IPI, Editore SIPI, Roma, 2000); 3 ISTAT “Statistiche del turismo” (1988-
1991) 
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Table 3. Property crimes in the host provinces of the 1990 Football World Cup with FE 
 
  Dependant variables 
  Pick-pocketing 
Bag-
snatching Shop-lifting Burglary Theft ex car 
Theft on the 
railways Car theft 
Host province in 1990 0.712 0.218 0.14 0.4 0.391 -0.04 0.281 
 (4.64)** (3.17)** (2.90)** (2.81)** (1.56) (0.94) (1.34) 
        
Added value  0.237 0.06 0.065 0.197 0.204 -0.014 0.15 
 (4.14)** (2.33)* (3.57)** (3.72)** (2.20)* (0.83) (1.93)+ 
        
Average wage -0.109 0.031 0.058 0.101 -0.23 -0.02 -0.42 
 (1.08) (0.67) (1.83)+ (1.07) (1.40) (0.56) (3.04)** 
        
Dependency Index 0.083 -0.058 0.008 0.049 -0.217 -0.03 -0.519 
 (1.31) (2.04)* (0.42) (0.82) (2.10)* (1.69)+ (6.00)** 
        
Unemployment Rate -0.003 0 -0.009 -0.03 -0.053 -0.004 0.004 
 (0.15) (0.01) (1.39) (1.56) (1.57) (0.65) (0.15) 
        
Empl. in Services/Tot. 
Empl. -0.016 -0.004 0 -0.047 -0.066 0.002 -0.019 
 (0.91) (0.46) (0.03) (2.87)** (2.31)* (0.32) (0.81) 
        
Probability of detection 0.017 -0.026 -0.086 -1.98 -2.122 -0.022 1.131 
 (0.04) (0.22) (0.50) (2.12)* (1.23) (0.38) (1.11) 
        
Near host provinces in 1990 -0.05 0.002 -0.009 0.067 -0.12 0.012 -0.033 
 (0.39) (0.03) (0.23) (0.57) (0.57) (0.34) (0.19) 
        
Year 1990 0.073 0.032 0.05 0.17 0.166 -0.002 0.085 
 (1.12) (1.09) (2.42)* (2.80)** (1.56) (0.12) (0.96) 
        
Constant -5.951 1.888 -1.612 -3.636 10.352 2.012 19.994 
 (1.72)+ (1.21) (1.47) (1.13) (1.83)+ (2.02)* (4.22)** 
        
Observations 380 378 380 380 380 364 380 
Note: We regress different types of property crimes on the host provinces of the 1990 Football World   
Cup using the fixed effect estimator. All the variables are normalized by the size of the population P. Added value is divided by 1000. 
Absolute value of t statistics is in parentheses:  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
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Table 3a. Other crimes in the host provinces of the 1990 Football World Cup with FE  
 
  Dependant variables 
  Fraud Rapes 
Personal 
intentional 
injuries 
Drugs Prostitution 
Host province in 1990 0.045 0.002 0.05 -0.045 -0.003 
 (0.68) (0.72) (2.01)* (1.13) (0.29) 
      
Added value  -0.025 -0.002 0.014 0.026 0.008 
 (1.03) (1.35) (1.47) (1.76)+ (1.65)+ 
      
Average wage 0.054 0.003 -0.009 0.016 -0.007 
 (1.23) (1.65) (0.56) (0.63) (0.83) 
      
Dependency Index -0.009 0.003 0.014 0 -0.002 
 (0.32) (2.26)* (1.33) (0.01) (0.31) 
      
Unemployment Rate -0.001 -0.001 0 -0.003 0.002 
 (0.08) (2.06)* (0.04) (0.57) (1.24) 
      
Empl. in Services/Tot. 
Empl. 0.001 0 -0.006 0.004 0 
 (0.17) (0.47) (1.97)* (0.93) (0.02) 
      
Probability of 
detection 0.048 -0.001 -0.231 0.029 -0.003 
 (0.37) (0.30) (5.32)** (0.19) (0.25) 
      
Near host provinces in 
1990 -0.032 0.001 -0.006 -0.02 -0.007 
 (0.57) (0.42) (0.28) (0.63) (0.64) 
      
Year 1990 -0.042 -0.002 -0.007 -0.035 -0.002 
 (1.45) (1.51) (0.63) (2.11)* (0.37) 
      
Constant 0.564 -0.125 -0.288 -0.505 -0.012 
 (0.38) (1.73)+ (0.50) (0.57) (0.04) 
      
Observations 380 327 380 380 330 
We regress different types of non property crimes on the host provinces of the 1990 Football World Cup using the fixed effect estimator. All 
the variables are normalized by the size of the population P. Added value is divided by 1000. Absolute value of t statistics is in parentheses:  
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
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Table 4. Property crimes in the host provinces of the 1990 Football World Cup with RE  
 
  Dependant variables 
  Pick-pocketing Bag-snatching 
Shop-
lifting Burglary Theft ex car 
Theft on the 
railways Car theft 
Host province in 1990 0.71 0.231 0.144 0.412 0.433 -0.041 0.367 
 (4.53)** (3.30)** (2.97)** (2.83)** (1.69)+ (0.94) (1.63) 
        
Added value  0.153 -0.012 0.034 0.083 -0.038 -0.001 -0.094 
 (4.21)** (0.76) (3.45)** (3.01)** (0.59) (0.15) (1.89)+ 
        
Average wage -0.008 0.133 0.07 0.103 0.547 0.007 0.75 
 (0.11) (4.51)** (3.65)** (1.93)+ (4.55)** (0.44) (7.79)** 
        
Host province 2.66 0.813 0.264 0.564 5.565 0.295 2.454 
 (6.95)** (5.12)** (2.87)** (2.35)* (7.23)** (4.55)** (4.97)** 
        
Dependency Index 0.036 -0.016 0.009 0.031 -0.107 -0.021 -0.142 
 (1.03) (1.05) (0.97) (1.28) (1.62) (3.06)** (3.02)** 
        
Unemployment Rate 0.025 0.009 -0.002 -0.014 0.005 0.001 0.041 
 (1.40) (1.20) (0.31) (0.95) (0.16) (0.13) (1.65)+ 
        
Empl. in Services/Tot. 
Empl. 0.023 -0.002 0.004 -0.005 -0.017 0.003 -0.007 
 (2.14)* (0.38) (1.61) (0.71) (0.86) (1.70)+ (0.51) 
        
Probability of detection -0.254 -0.132 -0.255 -3.143 -3.63 -0.046 -1.224 
 (0.54) (1.13) (1.61) (3.60)** (2.09)* (0.84) (1.21) 
        
Near host provinces in 
1990 -0.027 0.008 -0.004 0.092 -0.061 0.013 0.001 
 (0.21) (0.13) (0.11) (0.76) (0.28) (0.35) (0.00) 
        
Near host province -0.058 0.058 -0.016 -0.16 -0.164 -0.011 -0.09 
 (0.19) (0.46) (0.22) (0.85) (0.26) (0.21) (0.23) 
        
Year 1990 0.049 0.053 0.053 0.15 0.196 -0.005 0.19 
 (0.76) (1.86)+ (2.64)** (2.54)* (1.84)+ (0.28) (2.07)* 
        
Constant -5.101 -0.043 -1.405 -2.197 3.688 0.934 2.451 
 (2.44)* (0.05) (2.52)* (1.46) (0.96) (2.20)* (0.87) 
        
Observations 380 378 380 380 380 364 380 
Hausman test (Prob>chi2) 0.030 0.999 0.135 0.002 0.013 0.216 0.000 
Note: We regress different types of property crimes on the host provinces of the 1990 Football World Cup using the random effect 
estimator. All the variables are normalized by the size of the population P. Added value is divided by 1000. Absolute value of z statistics is 
in parentheses:  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Results of the Hausman test are in the last line. 
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Table 4a. Other crimes in the host provinces of the 1990 Football World Cup with RE 
 
  Dependant variables 
  Fraud Rapes Personal intentional injuries Drugs Prostitution 
Host province in 1990 0.044 0.002 0.049 -0.047 -0.002 
 (0.67) (0.67) (1.94)+ (1.19) (0.15) 
      
Added value  0.008 0 0.007 0.014 0 
 (0.93) (0.29) (1.60) (1.85)+ (0.46) 
      
Average wage -0.008 0 -0.014 0.018 -0.001 
 (0.47) (0.48) (1.58) (1.29) (0.63) 
      
Host province 0.074 -0.001 0.003 0.146 0.007 
 (1.15) (0.35) (0.08) (2.21)* (1.06) 
      
Dependency Index -0.007 0 0.006 -0.009 0.001 
 (0.97) (1.41) (1.37) (1.27) (1.78)+ 
      
Unemployment Rate 0.001 0 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.11) (0.15) (0.27) (0.43) (1.29) 
      
Empl. in Services/Tot. Empl. 0.001 0 0.001 0.003 0 
 (0.51) (2.36)* (0.54) (1.35) (0.70) 
      
Probability of detection 0.065 0 -0.269 -0.025 -0.002 
 (0.62) (0.05) (6.50)** (0.17) (0.17) 
      
Near host provinces in 1990 -0.036 0.002 -0.003 -0.02 -0.004 
 (0.66) (0.67) (0.15) (0.62) (0.37) 
      
Near host province 0.014 0 0.04 -0.033 0.003 
 (0.27) (0.05) (1.28) (0.63) (0.66) 
      
Year 1990 -0.042 -0.003 -0.015 -0.031 -0.002 
 (1.56) (2.26)* (1.44) (1.94)+ (0.41) 
      
Constant 0.404 -0.013 0.087 0.187 -0.022 
 (0.89) (0.77) (0.33) (0.44) (0.47) 
      
Observations 380 327 380 380 330 
Hausman test (Prob>chi2) 0.900 °° 0.059 0.601 0.845 
Note: We regress different types of non property crimes on the host provinces of the 1990 Football World Cup using the random effect 
estimator. All the variables are normalized by the size of the population P. Added value is divided by 1000. Absolute value of z statistics is 
in parentheses:  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Results of the Hausman test are in the last line. °°The 
estimated variance is negative.  
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Table 5. Robustness checks for property crimes 
 
 
  Dependant variables 
  Pick-pocketing 
Bag-
snatching 
Shop-
lifting Burglary 
Theft ex 
car 
Theft on 
the 
railways 
Car theft 
Province-specific linear time trends 
Host province in 1990 0.389 0.129 0.076 0.248 0.278 -0.017 0.017 
 (4.25)** (2.99)** (2.50)* (2.72)** (1.98)* (0.36) (0.14) 
Domestic and foreigner tourists 
Host province in 1990 0.695 0.212 0.143 0.392 0.386 -0.036 0.223 
 (4.50)** (3.06)** (2.95)** (2.72)** (1.53) (0.83) (1.07) 
Interaction tourists -hosting province 
Host province in 1990 0.534 0.369 0.302 0.528 0.664 0.072 0.439 
 (1.92)+ (2.98)** (3.54)** (2.07)* (1.47) (0.92) (1.18) 
Interaction tourists -hosting 
province 1990 0.028 -0.052 -0.051 -0.068 -0.116 -0.034 -0.088 
  -(0.44) (1.85)+ (2.63)** -(1.17) -(1.13) (1.92)+ -(1.04) 
Note: We did a robustness check regressing different types of property crimes on the host provinces of the 1990 Football World Cup using 
province-specific linear time trends, introducing domestic and foreigner tourists and, finally, interacting tourists with the hosting cities. Each 
section represents different regressions..Absolute value of t statistics are in parentheses:  + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5a. Robustness checks for other crimes 
 
 
 
  Dependant variables 
  Fraud Rapes Personal intentional injuries Drugs Prostitution 
Province-specific linear time trends 
Host province in 1990 0.003 0.004 0.038 -0.038 -0.001 
 (0.05) (1.12) (1.86)+ (1.12) (0.11) 
Domestic and foreigner tourists 
Host province in 1990 0.046 0.002 0.059 -0.042 0 
 (0.69) (0.87) (2.40)* (1.05) (0.02) 
Interaction tourists -hosting province 
Host province in 1990 0.09 -0.001 0.099 -0.009 -0.003 
 (0.75) (0.16) (2.25)* (0.12) (0.16) 
Interaction tourists -hosting province 
1990 -0.012 0.001 -0.015 -0.011 0.001 
  -(0.44) -(0.76) -1.51 -(0.70) -(0.20) 
 
Note: We did a robustness check regressing different types of non property crimes on the host provinces of the 1990 Football World Cup 
using province-specific linear time trends, introducing domestic and foreigner tourists and, finally, interacting tourists with the hosting 
cities. Each section represents different regressions. Absolute value of t statistics are in parentheses:  + significant at 10%; * significant at 
5%; ** significant at 1%.  
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Data Appendix - A qualitative description of the crimes 
Variable Description                                   
Rapes To compel a person through physical force or duress to have sexual 
intercourse 
 
Intentional personal injuries To commit physical injuries with guilty mind 
  
Pick-pocketing To steal from the pockets of others in public places 
  
Bag-snatching: To take an item the victim is wearing or carrying from the victim using 
(slight) force          
  
Shop-lifting To steal items from shops excluding theft by employees   
  
Burglary To enter any building or part of a building as a trespasser with the intention to 
steal 
  
Theft ex car To commit the theft of property from vehicles such as wheels and stereos, 
along with personal items like bags, briefcases, laptops, mobile phones, CDs, 
wallets and sunglasses, etc. 
  
Theft on the railways To commit a theft on the railways  
  
Car theft To commit the theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle 
  
Fraud To deceive someone to damage him usually to obtain property or services 
unjustly (example are flase advertising, identity theft, false billing, forgery of 
dicuments or signatures, false isurance claim, investment frauds, etc.) 
  
Drugs To produce and trade any drug product 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 It is a database created by “LABORatorio R. Revelli”  with data provided by INPS - the Italian Securitisation 
Programme of Social Security Contributions 
2The source is “Quindici anni di statistiche provinciali,” edited by Confindustria-IPI, Editore SIPI, Roma, 2000 
3The fixed effects estimator (FE) uses a transformation to remove the unobserved effect ai prior to estimation. It 
is called the “within” estimator because it relies on  
variations within provinces rather than between provinces. Any time-constant explanatory variables are removed 
along with ai. This methodology has to be used if the unobserved fixed effects are correlated with the 
explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2002). On the contrary the random effects estimator (RE) is attractive under 
the assumption that the unobserved effect is uncorrelated with all the explanatory variables. The random-effects 
estimator is more efficient than the fixed-effect as it uses both the cross-sectional (between) and time-series 
(within) variation of the data.  
 
